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COMMENTS
THE HIGHWAY CASES: NOISE AS A TAKING OR
DAMAGING OF PROPERTY IN CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
The rise of the industrial age has been accompanied by a
significant increase in noise from public transportation
sources.1 The clip-clop of horse hooves and squeak of carriage
wheels have been replaced by the intrusive and pervasive
noises produced by increasing numbers of automobiles on
freeways that are more and more congested. The evolution of
the airplane has been accompanied by a similar increase in
the amount of noise generated;2 the sonic boom may be the
most destructive form of noise ever encountered. While the
effects of this noise are still being studied, it has been estab-
lished that noise directly affects man's circulatory, reproduc-
tive, and nervous systems. Noise may also promote psycholog-
ical problems such as chronic fear, sleep loss, anxiety, and in
extreme cases, psychoses, hallucinations, and suicidal
tendencies. S
The response of the law to noise pollution has been un-
certain. Inverse condemnation has been the most popular
cause of action recently, but it has been inconsistently ap-
plied. In many cases, for example, recovery is allowed under
inverse condemnation for airport noise, whether or not there
is a taking of airspace by direct overflights. However, although
"traffic is seen to be generally . . . the highest ranking con-
scious noise source,"" people who complain in court of surface
0 1980 by Donald S. Black.
1. See generally Spater, Noise and the Law, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1373, 1373-74
(1965).
2. Id.
3. Kramon, Noise Control: Traditional Remedies and a Proposal for Federal
Action, 7 HARV. J. LEcis. 533-34 (1970); for a more in-depth discussion, see also C.
BRADDON, NOISE POLLUTION-THE UNQUIET CRISIS 63-90 (1970).
4. U.S. DEPT. OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, NOISE IN URBAN AND* SUB-
URBAN AREAS: RESULTS OF FIELD STUDIES 1, 6 (1967).
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traffic noise are denied recovery in inverse condemnation un-
less they establish a physical appropriation of their property.
The highway cases seem to be the only group in which a phys-
ical taking is required before there can be any recovery for
consequential damages such as noise.
The prevailing view in the highway cases has been widely
criticized.5 There are now indications that the law in Califor-
nia is changing, as at least one lower court has chafed at ap-
plying the physical appropriation theory. This comment will
undertake an evaluation of the application of inverse condem-
nation by the courts of California in highway cases where
there is no actual physical appropriation of land. The primary
vehicle for this evaluation will be a comparison with the appli-
cation of inverse condemnation throughout the country in air-
port noise cases. California courts are moving toward a new
standard for a taking or damaging of property by highway
noise that is more consistent with the airport cases; under this
new standard, a taking or damaging of property occurs when-
ever the noise causes a substantial and unreasonable interfer-
ence with enjoyment of property, thereby amounting to a
nuisance.
In order to facilitate discussion of the problem, it is help-
ful to delineate three common factual situations. Situation 1
(classic physical taking): The state condemns part of a per-
son's property in an eminent domain proceeding for highway
construction purposes. The highway is constructed on the
very land condemned. The property owner later sues the state
for consequential "severance damages" resulting from noise
5. See, e.g., T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTER-
PRETATION AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 462-63 (2d ed.
1874):
I cannot refrain from the expression of the opinion, that this limitation
of the term, taking, to the actual physical appropriation of property or a
divesting of title is, it seems to me, far too narrow a construction to
answer the purposes of justice, or to meet the demands of an equal ad-
ministration of the great powers of government.
The tendency under our system is too often to sacrifice the individ-
ual to the community; and it seems very difficult in reason to show why
the State should not pay for property of which it destroys or impairs the
value, as well as for what it physically takes. If by reason of a conse-
quential damage the value of real estate is positively diminished, it does
not appear arduous to prove that, in point of fact, the owner is deprived
of property, though a particular piece of property may not be actually
taken.
[Vol. 20
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which is caused by the construction and operation of the high-
way." Situation 2 (quasi-taking): The state condemns part of a
person's property for highway construction purposes. The
highway itself does not actually pass over the land taken
(e.g., the condemned portion of land is used for building a cul-
de-sac that does not itself produce the offensive effects). The
property owner later sues the state for damages caused by
noise resulting from the construction and operation of the
roadway. Situation 3 (no physical taking): The state con-
structs a highway that abuts or passes very close to a person's
property. There is thus no physical appropriation of land.
The property owner later sues in inverse condemnation for
damages caused by noise resulting from the construction and
operation of the highway. Although this comment is primarily
directed at type-3 (no physical taking) situations, reference
will be made to type-1 (classic physical taking) and type-2
(quasi-taking) situations for purposes of comparison.
THE HIGHWAY CASES
The Theory: Inverse Condemnation
An inverse condemnation action is an eminent domain
proceeding which is brought by the property owner rather
than the state, to recover the value of property that was taken
for public purposes without a condemnation proceeding.7 The
principles that affect the rights of the parties are the same as
in an eminent domain proceeding.8 Inverse condemnation is
thus an action that is grounded in either the state or federal
constitutions. While the federal and some state constitutions
provide for recovery only when property is "taken,"9 other
states, including California, allow recovery whenever property
is "taken or damaged." 10 Although the purpose of the "or
6. Where part of a parcel of real property is taken, severance damages include
those damages caused to the remainder of the property by the construction and oper-
ation of the improvement that necessitated the taking. They may be shown by prov-
ing the market value of the remainder before and after tle taking. People v. Loop,
127 Cal. App. 2d 786, 799, 274 P.2d 885, 895 (1954).
7. See generally Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemna-
tion: The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REV. 727, 730-31 (1967).
8. Id.
9. "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
10. "Private property may be taken or damaged for public use only when just
compensation, ascertained by a jury unless waived, has first been paid to, or into
1980']
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damaged" language was ostensibly to liberalize the law of
compensation for non-physical interference such as noise,1"
this has not been the result in the highway cases.
12
Although inverse condemnation is a constitutional cause
of action, decisions are fundamentally based on two compet-
ing policy considerations: 1 the even distribution of the cost of
public improvements so that one person is not required to
shoulder more than his share of the burden,"' and, alterna-
tively, a refusal to allow compensation to be so liberally
granted that government projects become excessively costly.' 5
And, as discussed below, when policy goals of society change
with regard to which public improvements are most needed
and desirable, this change should be reflected in the applica-
tion of inverse condemnation.' 6
court for, the owner .. " (Emphasis added.) CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19.
11. Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 775. See also Stoebuck, Condemnation by
Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and Prospect, 71 DICK. L. REV. 207, 223
(1967).
12. See Spater, supra note 1, at 1401-02.
13. Bacich v. Bd. of Control of Cal., 23 Cal. 2d 343, 350, 144 P.2d 818, 823
(1943). See also Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 732-33. The reason for the emerging
importance of policy questions in inverse condemnation actions is that legal reasoning
based on interpretations of constitutional terms has been abstract, circular, and
inconsistent.
Is the plaintiffs interest one that fits within the accepted concepts of
"property"? If so, has anything legally cognizable been "taken" or
"damaged"? Was the loss visited on plaintiff for a "public use"? How is
"just compensation" to be determined, and what elements of loss are
included in its computation? Sharp divisions of judicial opinion on ques-
tions pitched at this level of inquiry might readily be expected, and,
indeed, they permeate the case law . . . . In California, however, the
relevant policy postulates have increasingly been exposed to view by ap-
pellate judges as the courts have labored to construct a viable body of
consistent principles in recent years.
Id.
14. 23 Cal. 2d at 350, 144 P.2d at 823. One court has even said: "The decisive
consideration is whether the owner of the damaged property, if uncompensated
would contribute more than his proper share to the public undertaking." (Emphasis
added.) Clement v. State Reclamation Bd., 35 Cal. 2d 628, 642, 220 P.2d 897, 905
(1950).
15. 23 Cal. 2d at 350, 144 P.2d at 823.
16. "Inverse condemnation epitomizes a struggle between the security of 'estab-
lished economic interests' and 'the forces of social change' which cannot be rationally
resolved by a mere search for definitions." Van Alstyne, supra note 7, at 735.
THE HIGHWAY CASES
The Symons-Lombardy Rule
People v. Symons 17 was an early landmark case where
property owners argued that highway noise constituted a tak-
ing or damaging of their property. Although it involved a
type-2 (quasi-taking) situation, Symons has been cited by
later courts as precedent for holdings in type-3 (no physical
taking) situations.
Part of Symons' residential lot had been condemned in an
eminent domain proceeding for construction of the San Diego
Freeway. The condemned property did not become part of the
freeway, but was used to construct a cul-de-sac at the end of
the street terminated by the freeway. While the trial court al-
lowed damages for the fair market value of the property taken
and for damage to Symons' lawn and sprinkler system, it ex-
cluded testimony as to decreased market value of the home as
a result of noise, fumes, and dust from the freeway. 18
The California Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
there can be no recovery of consequential damages for noise
that is caused by the freeway on lands other than those ap-
propriated for the freeway itself.9 There was no case directly
on point; therefore the court's holding was based on earlier
cases where recovery was sought for consequential damages
without any physical appropriation. In widely quoted dictum,
the court said:
It is established that when a public improvement is made
on property adjoining that of one who claims to be dam-
aged by such general factors as change of neighborhood,
noise, dust, change of view, diminished access and other
factors . .. there can be no recovery where there has
been no actual taking or severance of the claimant's
property.20
By extending the reasoning of earlier type-3 (no physical
taking) situations to a type-2 (quasi-taking) situation, the
court indicated that similar principles govern both factual
patterns and that the results reached should be identical. In-
deed, the logic underlying the result in both situations is simi-
lar; in both classes of cases the damage caused by noise and
17. 54 Cal. 2d 855, 357 P.2d 451, 9 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1960).
18. Id. at 858, 357 P.2d at 453, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
19. Id. at 860, 357 P.2d at 454, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
20. Id.
1980] 429
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other factors results from "the maintenance and operation of
the freeway on lands other than those taken from" the prop-
erty owner.21 Despite this logical similarity, Symons has been
narrowly construed by the California judiciary and completely
abrogated by the legislature in type-2 situations, and yet re-
mains intact in its application where no physical appropria-
tion has occurred.
In Lombardy v. Peter Kiewitt Sons' Co.2 3 a California
court of appeal applied Symons to a type-3 situation and de-
nied recovery where owners of property adjacent to that used
for construction of a freeway filed suit in inverse condemna-
tion. The property owners claimed that, as a proximate result
of the construction and operation of the freeway, they sus-
tained injuries and damage to their property caused by the
emission of noxious fumes, loud noise and dust. The court
sustained a demurrer to the complaint, holding that there was
no allegation of damage in a substantial amount, which it
equated with physical damage to property. 4 Although it de-
nied recovery, the court admitted that there had been an in-
jury in fact:
All householders who live in the vicinity of crowded free-
ways, highways and city streets suffer in like manner in
varying degrees. The roar of automobiles and trucks, the
shock of hearing screeching brakes and collisions, and the
smoke and fumes which are in proportion to the density
of the motor vehicle traffic all contribute to the loss of
peace and quiet which our forefathers enjoyed before the
invention of the gas engine. 5
Lombardy, like Symons, was a decision fundamentally
rooted in the competing policy considerations of the eminent
domain provision of the California Constitution. Although in
21. Id.
22. See text accompanying notes 23-28 infra.
23. 266 Cal. App. 2d 599, 72 Cal. Rptr. 240 (1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 813
(1969).
24. See 266 Cal. App. at 602, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 242:
There was no allegation that the land of plaintiffs had sunk or shifted,
the foundations of the houses had sunk, that walls had been cracked,
windows broken or that the building had sustained any other type of
injury or damage. The allegation that the described acts of defendants
have caused "damages" to real property ... was not an allegation that
the real property has sutained damage in any substantial amount.
25. Id. at 605, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 244.
[Vol. 20
THE HIGHWAY CASES
both cases the property owners had alleged a reduction in
property values caused by the noise, dust, and fumes emanat-
ing from the freeway, they were denied recovery for a damag-
ing of property. In effect, the property owners were forced to
absorb whatever loss was caused in order that the develop-
ment of the state transportation system could proceed
unimpeded.26
The Symons-Lombardy line of cases enunciated the rule
that, where an offending street or highway is not constructed
and operated on land actually taken from the claimant, there.
may be no recovery under inverse condemnation for noise,
dust, noxious odors, and other types of non-physical damage
to property, no matter how severe. Recovery has therefore
been based not on the extent of harm, but on the fortuitous
incidence of a physical taking.2 7 And although the rule has
been criticized28 and the opinions narrowly construed by some
courts, the scheme remains substantially valid in type-3
situations.
Retreat from Symons
The denial of recovery in type-2 (quasi-taking) situations
has been based on Symons's implication that type-2 situations
should be treated the same as situations where there is no
physical appropriation. Current application of Symons to
type-2 situations is therefore an important indicator of how
the rule will be applied in type-3 (no physical taking) situa-
tions which may arise in the future.
Two early post-Symons decisions applied its rule to type-
2 situations and denied recovery. In People ex rel. Depart-
ment of Public Works v. Elsmore,29 severance damages were
denied where part of the claimant's property was taken for
freeway purposes, but used only for a cleared strip running
alongside the roadbed. Similarly, in City of Berkeley v. Von
Adelung,30 a small triangle of land was taken for the widening
26. Id. at 604, 72 Cal. Rptr. at 243; see also Kramon, supra note 3, at 545-46.
27. Van Alstyne, Intangible Detriment, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 491, 505 (1969).
See also Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1226-27 (1967).
28. People ex rel. Dep't of the Pub. Works v. Volunteers of Am., 21 Cal. App.
3d 111, 117-28, 98 Cal. Rptr. 423, 426-35 (1971).
29. 229 Cal. App. 2d 809, 40 Cal. Rptr. 613 (1964).
30. 214 Cal. App. 2d 791, 29 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1963).
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of a street. Defendant's claim for severance damages in the
eminent domain proceeding was denied:
At most, defendant's offered proof would show only that
the project as a whole would increase traffic flow past his
lot. He offered nothing to show that such increase would
either be effected or affected by the taking of a small bit
of his property to round off one corner.31
However, when the California Supreme Court next con-
sidered the Symons rule, it expressly overruled Elsmore, and
announced a less restrictive test for quasi-taking situations. In
People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Ramos,"2 an
eminent domain action, the state condemned part of Ramos'
land for state highway purposes. As in Symons, the parcel
taken was not used for construction of the freeway proper, but
for the construction of a fence on the new property line and
for the dirt shoulder of the road. Ramos' claim for severance
damages resulting from loss of access, a type of non-physical
damage to property, was rejected by the trial court on the ba-
sis of Elsmore33
The California Supreme Court reversed the lower court
and overruled Elsmore in a situation where it could easily
have affirmed based on a broad reading of Symons. Although
the freeway itself was not located on Ramos' property, the
court ruled that the land taken for the freeway right-of-way
was taken for use as part of the freeway and Ramos could
therefore claim severance damages for the loss of access.84
In Ramos, the court construed Symons narrowly in a
type-2 situation. The phrases "freeway proper" and "freeway
itself," as they were used in Symons, were held in Ramos to
include the entire freeway right-of-way. Although the court
clung to the notion that a taking was required, its emphasis
was less on whether part of the freeway actually passed over
the land and more on the actual harm suffered. Carried to its
ultimate extreme this reasoning would completely change the
law where no physical appropriation occurs.
A further retreat from Symons in California is evidenced
by People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Volunteers
31. Id. at 793, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 803.
32. 1 Cal. 3d 261, 460 P.2d 992, 81 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1969).
33. Id. at 264, 460 P.2d at 994, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
34. Id.
[Vol. 20432
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of America. 5 Although reaching a result consistent with Ra-
mos in a type-2 situation, the California court of appeal deliv-
ered a scathing attack on the taking requirement of the pre-
vailing rule:
[T]he dividing line between those who are entitled to con-
sequentiAl damages and those who are not, is at best arbi-
trary. On the one hand it can be said that certain diminu-
tion of the value of its property resulting to the defendant
is no greater than that suffered by neighboring property
owners who lost no land by reason of the improve-
ment .... By the same token this diminution of value is
just as great as that suffered by a landowner who retains
an equivalent parcel after giving up a strip of greater
width which falls under part or all of the projected im-
provement . . . .6
...It is obvious that adjacent property is damaged
to the same degree whether no property is taken, whether
a :mere narrow strip is taken, or whether a substantial
portion of the property is taken.8
More important, the court directly attacked the policy under-
pinnings which had supported denials of compensation when
no physical appropriation had occurred:
[W]ith changing concepts of the rights of an individual to
his privacy and to enjoy an environment unpolluted by
noise, dust, and fumes, it may not be improper to con-
sider whether other means of transportation should be
substituted for the private automobile. Any consideration
of this question is clouded if the true economic burden of
providing freeways for motor vehicle traffic is concealed
by requiring adjacent owners to contribute more than
their proper share to the public undertaking.88
In response to the attacks on Symons by Ramos and Vol-
unteers, the California legislature enacted section 1263.420(b)
of the Code of Civil Procedure 9 which allows owners of par-
tially condemned land to recover damages caused by the
35. 21 Cal. App. 3d 111, 98 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1971).
36. Id. at 120, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
37. Id. at 127-28, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
38. Id. at 128, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
39. The new code section took effect on July 1, 1976. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
1230.065 (West Supp. 1979).
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construction and use of the project for which the property
is taken in the manner proposed by the [government],
whether or not the damage is caused by a portion of the
project located on the part taken."'
The Law Revision Commission Comment states:
Subdivision (b) abrogates the rule in Symons by allowing
recovery for damages to the remainder caused by the pro-
ject regardless of the precise location of the damage-caus-
ing portion of the project if the damages are otherwise
compensable.4 1
The Commission also cites Volunteers for the rule that the
"test of compensability is whether the condemnee is obligated
to bear more than his 'proper share' of the burden of the pub-
lic improvement."' 2
Although there was no expressed intent on the part of the
legislature to affect the application of Symons to type-3 situa-
tions, the new statute will influence future decisions in these
no physical taking, type-3, cases. As indicated above, Symons
equated type-3 situations with type-2 situations in holding
that the result in each should be the same. More fundamen-
tally, with the passage of section 1263.420(b), the legislature
has accepted the general premise that recovery should not de-
pend on the location of the damage-causing street or highway,
but whether a person is required to bear more than his share
of the cost of public undertakings.
Although a change in judicial thought is taking place, the
California courts have considered few highway cases involving
type-3 situations in recent years. Therefore, in order to fur-
ther evaluate the taking requirement and determine the direc-
tion the law will move, it is helpful to consider the application
of inverse condemnation to cases involving airport noise.
THE AIRPORT CASES
Although the claims of noise sufferers next to highways
have been defeated in the absence of a physical taking, this
has not been the result when the noise emanates from air traf-
fic. Many states have done away with the requirement of a
40. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 1263.420(b) (West Supp. 1979).
41. 12 CAL. LAW REV. COMM'N REP. 1836 (1974).
42. Id.
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direct overflight-analogous to the physical taking require-
ment of the highway cases-for recovery under inverse con-
demnation for airport noise. This is particularly true in those
states whose constitutions allow recovery for a damaging of
property in addition to a taking. Several courts and commen-
tators have .suggested that the principle of the airport cases,
allowing recovery without direct overflights, is equally appli-
cable to the highway cases.48
The Traditional Federal View
The federal courts were the first to attempt the applica-
tion of inverse condemnation to cases involving noise from
airports. The earliest cases applied the law of inverse condem-
nation in the airport cases much as it is currently applied in
the highway cases. However, the principles of the airport cases
have evolved in the state courts so that plaintiffs who once
were denied recovery on arguments similar to those made in
highway cases now often prevail.
The first significant case was United States v. Causby."
The Causbys were owners of property that included a house
and a chicken farm. This property was located near an airport
that was leased by the United States government for military
purposes. Government airplanes using the airport would fly
directly over the Causby's property at low altitudes, causing
high noise levels that resulted in loss of sleep, nervousness,
and fright, and rendered the property useless as a chicken
farm.""
The Court held that the Causbys were entitled to com-
pensation for the damage caused by the noise and other inci-
dents of the overflights.46 It reasoned that there had been a
physical taking of property within the meaning of the fifth
amendment: "[T]he line of flight is over the land. And the
land is appropriated as directly and completely as if it were
43. See Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162
(1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Vol-
unteers of America, 21 Cal. App. 3d 111, 98 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1971); Alevizos v. Metro-
politan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 216 N.W.2d 651 (1974); Board of Educ. v.
Palmer, 88 N.J. Super. 378, 212 A.2d 564 (App. Div. 1965), rev'd on other grounds, 46
N.J. 522, 218 A.2d 153 (1966).
44. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
45. Id. at 258-59.
46. Id. at 266-67.
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used for the runways themselves.' 1 7 The case was thus de-
cided as a type-1 (classic physical taking) fact situation, and
the damages allowed were similar to severance damages al-
lowed when there is a physical taking of property.
It is significant that the Causby Court held that a taking
occurred whenever flights are "so low and so frequent as to be
a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and
use of the land.""' This is, in effect, a nuisance standard."9
Thus, although Causby required a physical taking in the sense
of an overflight before consequential damages for noise could
be recovered, it sowed the seeds for the later development of a
doctrine that does not require such overflights.
Batten v. United States50 directly addressed the situation
of noise generated by airplanes not directly overhead. The dis-
trict court found a substantial interference with the use and
enjoyment of property and a corresponding diminution of
value; it denied recovery for the noise, however, because there
were no overflights, and therefore no taking under the fifth
amendment.51 Although admitting, as many of the highway
cases have, that the noise, vibration, and dust affect relatively
equally those whose property is overflown and those whose
property is not overflown,52 the circuit court relied on Causby
to distinguish those damages that were "merely consequent-
ial," i.e., not the result of a "taking," and those that were "the
product of a direct invasion of [the property owner's]
domain." '
Chief Judge Murrah's dissent has been cited by state
courts that have done away with the physical appropriation
requirement:5'
It is my thesis that a constitutional taking does not de-
47. Id. at 262.
48. Id. at 266.
49. [1It appears to be noise and glare, to the extent and under the cir-
cumstances shown here, which make the Government a seizer of private
property. But the allegation of noise and glare resulting in damages,
constitutes at best an action in tort where there might be recovery if the
noise and light constituted a nuisance. . ..
Id. at 269-70 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Stoebuck, supra note 11, at 220.
50. 306 F.2d 580 (10th Cir. 1962).
51. Id. at 585.
52. Id. at 583.
53. Id. at 584, quoting from United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1945).
54. See note 59 and accompanying text infra.
[Vol. 20
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pend on whether the Government physically invaded the
property damaged .... As I reason, the constitutional
test in each case is first, whether the asserted interest is
one which the law will protect; if so, whether the interfer-
ence is sufficiently direct, sufficiently peculiar, and of suf-
ficient magnitude to cause us to conclude that fairness
and justice, as between the State and the citizen, requires
the burden imposed to be borne by the public and not by
the individual alone."
This dissent has not yet been accepted by any federal court.
Like the highway cases, the federal airport cases give practical
significance to the proposition that "it is the character of the
invasion, not the amount of damage resulting from it. . . that
determines the question whether it is a taking."56
State Liberalization of the Overflight Requirement
Many states, particularly those without the "damaging"
language in their constitutions, follow the federal rule enunci-
ated in Causby and Batten. Others have rejected this ap-
proach and do not draw a distinction between flights that are
directly overhead and those that are not. The latter group can
be subdivided according to the standard that they apply to
the taking requirement.. The nuisance standard requires a
substantial and unreasonable interference with property, re-
sulting in a decline in market value; the less restrictive public
benefit standard requires only a measurable diminution in
property value.
Nuisance standard. Among the states that have applied
the nuisance standard are Oregon (a state without the "dam-
aging" language in its constitution), and California (a state
with the "damaging" language in its constitution).
An important early case was Thornburg v. Port of Port-
land,5 7 an action in inverse condemnation brought by prop-
erty owners living under and to the side of the glide paths of
airplanes using the runways of the Portland International Air-
port. The property owners based their claims for damages
from flights directly over their land and from those not di-
55. 306 F.2d at 586-87.
56. 328 U.S. at 266, quoting from United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316, 328
(1916).
57. 233 Or. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
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rectly overhead on the same theory and authorities. Likewise,
the court dealt with the two situations as one, choosing to de-
cide the broad question, "whether a noise-nuisance can
amount to a taking."' 8
The Oregon Supreme Court answered affirmatively, ex-
plicitly following the dissent in Batten,59 and summed up its
reasoning in general terms that seem equally applicable to the
highway cases:
If we accept, as we must upon established principles
of servitudes, the validity of the proposition that noise
can be a nuisance; that a nuisance can give rise to an
easement; and that a noise coming straight down from
above one's land can ripen into a taking if it is persistent
enough and aggravated enough, then logically the same
kind and degree of interference with the use and enjoy-
ment of one's land can also be a taking even though the
noise vector may come from some direction other than
the perpendicular.60
After the initial remand, Thornburg again was appealed
to the Oregon Supreme Court. 1 The trial court had under-
stood the repeated references to nuisance in the first opinion
to mean that a plaintiff must survive a balancing test to re-
cover; it therefore submitted to the jury eight instructions re-
quested by the Port that dealt with the social utility of the
airport.21 The Oregon Supreme Court held this to be error,
and clarified the standard to be applied.
If the jury finds an interference with the plaintiff's use
and enjoyment of his land, substantial enough to result in
a loss of market value, there is a taking . . . The error
below was in telling the jury in effect to consider the util-
ity of the airport in deciding whether the plaintiff's prop-
58. Id. at 180, 376 P.2d at 101.
59. We believe the dissenting view in the Batten case presents the better-
reasoned analysis of the legal principles involved, and that if the major-
ity view in the Batten case can be defended it must be defended frankly
upon the ground that considerations of public policy justify the result:
i.e., that private rights must yield to public convenience in this class of
cases. The rationale of the case is circular. The majority said in effect
that there is no taking because the damages are consequential and the
damages are consequential because there is no taking.
Id. at 187, 376 P.2d at 104.
60. Id. at 192, 376 P.2d at 106.
61. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 244 Or. 69, 415 P.2d 750 (1966).
62. Id. at 71, 415 P.2d at 751.
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erty had been depreciated in value by the defendant's ac-
tivities. This notion is wholly inconsistent with the law of
eminent domain, and had no place in the jury's considera-
tion of market value."
In Aaron v. City of Los Angeles,6' the leading California
case, the state court of appeal rejected arguments grounded
on the Symons physical appropriation approach, and ex-
pressly adopted the Thornburg approach. Property owners
near Los Angeles International Airport brought an action in
inverse condemnation to recover lost property values that re-
sulted from jet noise emanating from the airport. The court
specifically declined to adopt the federal overflight require-
ment, and followed the nuisance standard instead:
The municipal owner and operator of an airport is liable
for a taking or damaging of property when the owner of
property in the vicinity of the airport can show a measur-
able reduction in market value resulting from the opera-
tion of the airport in such manner that the noise from
aircraft using the airport causes a substantial interference
with the use and enjoyment of the property, and the in-
terference is sufficiently direct and sufficiently peculiar
that the owner, if uncompensated, would pay more than
his proper share to the public undertaking."
Several aspects of the Aaron opinion are particularly
noteworthy with respect to the California highway cases.
First, the court rejected the city's argument, based on Sy-
mons, that noise damage is merely consequential and there-
fore insufficient for a successful claim under inverse condem-
nation.68  In so doing, however, the court summarily
distinguished all highway cases on the ground that they in-
volve significantly lower noise levels.6 7 Second, the court ad-
mitted that "[t]here is a very close relation between the con-
cepts of inverse condemnation and nuisance by a government
entity," and then incorporated the substantial interference
concept into its holding." Finally, the court's holding was
63. Id. at 74, 415 P.2d at 752-53.
64. 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122
(1975).
65. 40 Cal. App. 3d. at 483-84, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
66. Id. at 482, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 169-70.
67. Id. at 483, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
68. Id. at 481, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
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based on rarely admitted evidence in the form of a study that
measured the noise levels surrounding the airport.6 9 This step
indicates a shift in the airport cases away from meaningless
concepts of taking and towards actual interference caused. It
is a step that has not been taken in the highway cases.
The cases applying the nuisance standard to inverse con-
demnation are the product of a movement toward more equi-
table criteria based not on the character of the invasion, but
on the actual amount of damage done. Accordingly, where a
plaintiff can show a substantial and unreasonable interference
with property rights resulting in a decrease in market value,
he is entitled to recover. One court that has eliminated the
overflight requirement has further liberalized the law by not
requiring a substantial and unreasonable interference with
property rights. This court has enunciated what has been
called a public benefit standard.
Public benefit standard. Martin v. Port of Seattle" was
brought by property owners who lived near the Seattle-Ta-
coma International Airport. They alleged a decrease in market
value of their property as a result of flights to and from the
nearby airport. Although there was no allegation of overflight,
or even of substantial interference, the Washington Supreme
Court held that the plaintiffs had stated an actionable claim,
equating damage, for which compensation was required, with
any proven decline in the market value of real estate.7 ' The
court refused to apply the nuisance standard and thus re-
jected the idea that "the individual must bear a certain
amount of inconvenience and loss of peace and quiet as the
cost of living in a modern progressing society.
'7 2
Martin represents the completion of the circle in the law
of inverse condemnation as it is applied in the airport cases.
The pure physical invasion theory applied in the federal
courts was mixed with nuisance principles in many states to
achieve more equitable results. In Martin, more of a pure in-
verse condemnation theory was again applied, but paradoxi-
cally, one that was sufficiently broad to permit recovery where
the federal theory and even the nuisance standard would not.
Recovery has thus come to be increasingly based upon injury-
69. Id. at 485, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
70. 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965).
71. Id. at 320, 391 P.2d at 547.
72. Id. at 318, 391 P.2d at 546.
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in-fact rather than arbitrary physical invasion criteria. The
development of these new theories is indicative of the course
the law may take in future California highway cases.
APPLICABILITY OF AIRPORT STANDARDS TO HIGHWAY CASES
The California highway cases have lagged behind the air-
port cases in the development of inverse condemnation doc-
trine that is responsive to the needs and problems of modern
society. While past courts have been reluctant to apply the
reasoning of the airport cases in the highway cases, the argu-
ments against that position are becoming more persuasive; a
smattering of case law indicates that things are beginning to
change, especially in other jurisdictions. In California, many
highway cases have not reached the appellate level; as a re-
sult, there has been little opportunity to review the current
rule and expand recovery in the highway cases to the level
afforded in the airport cases.7" The issue is whether such an
expansion can and should occur.
At first blush, the two classes of cases are so similar as to
obviate the necessity of extensive discussion of this issue. On
the most general level, both types of cases deal with the same
question: To what extent must a property owner tolerate pub-
lic improvements that interfere with his property rights before
he is entitled to be compensated? One commentator has writ-
ten: "[T]he airport cases are the spearhead of a long develop-
ment that now is likely to produce general acceptance of an
eminent domain doctrine at which previously a few courts
have only nibbled. 7 4 Others have spoken of the two types of
cases in virtually the same breath, implicitly acknowledging
that the problems are the same.7 Finally, the California Leg-
73. A recent unsuccessful appeal concerned homeowners who lived along a
street that was to be improved so as to serve as ingress and egress to Interstate High-
way 280 for much of the city of San Carlos. The trial court sustained a demurrer to
the complaint and, in an unpublished decision, the court of appeal affirmed. Crest-
view Homeowner's Ass'n v. City of San Carlos, 1 Civ. No. 43794 (Ct. App. Cal. Dec. 5,
1978).
74. Stoebuck, supra note 11, at 208.
75. Currently accepted doctrinal and procedural techniques for allocating
the real costs of environmental changes resulting from the freeway and
jet transport aircraft ...have proven inadequate. Under the present
legal regime, loss of amenities of property ownership-whether in the
form of reduced accessability or increased discomfort and annoyance
from externally imposed noise-frequently and routinely appear to be
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islature has also spoken of the two types of problems as
one-noise from transportation sources." In spite of these
surface similarities, however, persuasive arguments have been
made that the principle of the airport cases should not be ex-
tended to the highway cases.
Different Noise Levels
There is a substantial difference between the noise gener-
ated by aircraft and the noise generated by most street and
highway traffic. For example, a single jet at takeoff generates a
noise level of 120 dB(A) 77 measured at a distance of 200 feet;
the noise generated from a busy freeway has been measured at
only 70 dB(A) at a distance of only fifty feet.7 8 Although the
Council on Environmental Quality has labelled noise levels
above 65 dB(A) "intrusive," and those above 90 dB(A) as
"damaging,"' 9 courts have used this difference in noise levels
as justification for rejecting the applicability of arguments
drawn from one type of case to the other.80
To admit the existence of a difference does not, however,
necessarily mean that the principle of the airport cases is not
applicable to the highway cases. There are circumstances that
raise the noise level of a particular stretch of road, or of any
stretch of road at particular times of the day, to levels compa-
translated into uncompensated financial losses in the form of dimin-
ished property values. (Emphasis added.)
Van Alstyne, Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative
Modifications in California, 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 491, 543 (1969).
76. The legislature finds that: . . . (b) The proliferation of noise from
transportation sources have led to the exposure of large sectors of the
populace to an unacceptable degree of noise. (c) The anticipated rates of
construction of new airports and extension of existing airports, construc-
tion of freeways . . . will rapidly escalate the urban noise problem un-
less systematic preventive measures are taken.
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16000 (West Supp. 1979).
77. "dB(A)" is a logarithmic measure of sound levels; the "A" scale corresponds
to the frequency response of the human ear. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY-1970, at 125.
78. Even this 70 dB(A) noise level exceeds noise standards issued by the Fed-
eral Highway Administration in 1973 to be used in the planning and design of free-
ways. The following standards were set: 60 dB(A) for land where serenity and quiet
are important and serve a public need; 70 dB(A) for the exterior of residences; and 55
dB(A) for the interior of residences. 23 C.F.R. § 772.13 (1978).
79. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 77, at.125.
80. See, e.g., Northcutt v. State Road Dep't, 209 So. 2d 710, 711 (Dist. Ct. App.
1968); Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 482-83, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 169-
70; Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. at 190-91, 376 P.2d at 16.
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rable to airports. A road that is built on a steep grade will
produce more noise than one that is straight and level. Fur-
thermore, certain types of surface traffic produce more noise
than other types. A 1974 study by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency determined that a third floor apartment next to a
freeway in Los Angeles is exposed to sound levels of up to 92
dB(A).8' In cases like this, the noise may be so severe that it
would constitute a taking or damaging of property in an air-
port noise context; nevertheless, courts would generally not al-
low damages in a highway situation in the absence of a physi-
cal invasion.
A general difference in the noise levels does not justify a
strict physical appropriation restriction in all cases. The ap-
plication of the airport standard to the highway cases would
require a case-by-case determination of whether or not the
noise was severe enough to constitute a taking or damaging.
For this purpose evidence could be introduced relating to the
diminution of property values caused by the noise. While it is
likely that the proportion of successful highway suits would be
smaller, the determination of whether or not a cognizable tak-
ing or damaging had occurred would more closely approxi-
mate actual harm suffered.
Torrent of Litigation
The argument has been made that streets and highways
must necessarily be constructed near centers of population
while airports can be removed from congested areas and still
be useful.8 2 Therefore, noise sufferers next to highways are
merely suffering in common with the many thousands of other
persons consigned to a similar fate. Some argue that if noise
sufferers next to these highways were given a cause of action,
a torrent of litigation would ensue.
As the airport cases illustrate, the elimination of the
physical taking or damaging requirement need not lead to a
torrent of litigation. Under a nuisance theory, substantial
harm must be demonstrated as a prerequisite to stating a
cause of action in inverse condemnation.8 Whether or not
substantial noise interference exists may be determined by us-
81. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, supra note 77, at 86.
82. 209 So. 2d at 711.
83. See text accompanying notes 56-69 supra.
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ing modern noise measurement techniques. 4
Further limiting the number of suits likely to be filed is
the probability that many potential plaintiffs along an ex-
isting street or highway would consolidate their actions or
bring class actions on behalf of property owners abutting a
single thoroughfare. The clear community of interests has en-
couraged such consolidations in a number of suits involving
noise from airports."' Finally, where the street or highway is
yet to be constructed, the consideration of possible costly law
suits would make it more cost efficient to construct so as to
baffle excessive noise or bypass particularly susceptible geo-
graphic areas.86
Cost of Highway Construction
A frequently expressed argument has been that the courts
must help effectuate the public policy promoting the con-
struction of streets and highways by "seeing to it that the cost
of public improvements involving the taking and damaging of
property for public use be not unduly enhanced. ' 87 Thus, the
reasoning goes, if compensation were allowed without a direct
physical appropriation, the number of claims would escalate
and new road and highway construction would become pro-
hibitively expensive.
Critics of the taking requirement note that the same ar-
gument was made in favor of the overflight requirement in the
airport cases. 8 The rejection of the overflight requirement in
many states has not resulted in the destruction of the aviation
industry. This is because the most popular substitute for the
84. See, e.g., Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 485 n.8, 115 Cal.
Rptr. at 171 n.8.
85. See, e.g., Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 6 Cal. 3d 924, 496 P.2d 480, 101
Cal. Rptr. 568 (1972), where 700 named plaintiffs brought suit for injuries caused by
the operation of the Santa Monica Airport; Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App.
3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975), where the suit
was brought on behalf of all owners of residential property in the vicinity of the air-
port; City of Oakland v. Nutter, 13 Cal. App. 3d 752, 92 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1970), where
17 separate actions in eminent domain by the city against various landowners to ac-
quire an air easement were consolidated for trial.
86. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
87. People v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d at 861, 357 P.2d at 455, 9 Cal. Rptr. at 367,
quoting from People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 396, 144 P.2d 799, 802 (1943); see
also Lombardy v. Peter Kiewitt Sons' Co., 266 Cal. App. 2d at 603-04, 72 Cal. Rptr. at
243.
88. Van Alstyne, supra note 75, at 530.
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physical appropriation theory has been the application of the
nuisance standard under which a successful plaintiff must
show substantial and unreasonable interference with property
rights." While claims may increase, they would still be limited
by this fundamental requirement.
Furthermore, the cost argument does not address the fact
that the social costs involved in the construction and opera-
tion of a road do not disappear if there is no accountability by
the public agency responsible for the road. Rather, these costs
are directly borne by the abutting landowners. "The funda-
mental question. . . is not whether these costs will be paid; it
is who will pay them."90 There is much support among the
commentators and the courts for the proposition that the
costs should be paid by those who benefit from the highway,
not innocent bystanders."
Finally, there is some doubt about whether the courts are
still implementing public policy by attempting to reduce the
costs of highway construction. Recently, there has been a dra-
matic reduction in the amount of new highway construction,
primarily due to current policies favoring fiscal restraint and
environmental protection. And the California Legislature has
recognized that noise from streets and highways is a factor to
be considered in future transportation decisions.'2
Certainty of Result
It has been said that requiring physical taking before re-
covery may be granted for noise damage provides the most
accurate and predictable means of differentiating between
compensable and non-compensable claims. One commentator
writes:
[The physical invasion] theory evolved in an era when
conflicts were mainly confined to surface property and in-
visible agents of invasion were in a crude state of develop-
ment, if existent. Surface property boundaries are visually
89. See text accompanying notes 84-85 supra.
90. Van Alstyne, supra note 75, at 543.
91. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. de-
nied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965); People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Volunteers of
America, 21 Cal. App. 3d at 128, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 435; see also Berger, The California
Supreme Court-A Shield Against Overreaching: Nestle v. City of Santa Monica, 9
CAL. W. L. REV. 199, 201-02 (1973).
92. See note 76 supra.
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discernable, and a tangible agent takes up space, so the
process of invasion and occupation is a deterministic
event. Theories that place tangible or physical factors at
the juncture of liability ease the management of justice
and thus traditionally have been favored by the law.
93
The continuing viability of the above argument is ques-
tionable. Modern methods of measuring noise intensity will
ensure that judicial or legislative standards relating noise in-
tensity to a taking or damaging will be accurately applied in
every case. In Aaron v. City of Los Angeles,94 for example, it
was pointed out that noise from jet aircraft is capable of being
accurately measured in terms that indicate how much annoy-
ance it causes.9 5 It was partly on this basis that that court did
away with the overflight requirement. 6 And the physical inva-
sion doctrine is particularly inappropriate in an age where the
effects of unseen intruders are often more damaging than
those of agents with physical substance.
The arguments in favor of adopting some type of hybrid
inverse condemnation/nuisance theory are now coming to the
fore. The prevailing rule, embodied in the Symons-Lombardy
line of cases, has been criticized and limited. In short, it is
increasingly suggested that the arbitrary physical invasion
standard be replaced by a standard that is rationally related
to the injury suffered.
Other jurisdictions have explicitly recognized arguments
that apply principles enunciated in the airport cases to the
93. Alekshun, Aircraft Noise Law: A Technical Perspective, 55 A.B.A. J. 740,
740-41 (1969).
94. See text accompanying notes 64-70 supra.
95. It is suggested that unless recovery in inverse condemnation is lim-
ited to landowners suffering from flyover aircraft, there will be no rea-
sonable way to draw a line to distinguish between those landowners who
would have a cause of action and those who would not. The develop-
ment of NEF contour areas provides a good means of drawing a reasona-
ble line between those landowners who may establish a cause of action
for inverse condemnation and those who may not. All landowners who
suffer from substantially the same noise level are treated on an equal
basis. Thus, all landowners located in NEF area 'C' are subjected to
noise from jet aircraft which substantially interferes with residential
comfort, enjoyment and use of their property and which is substantiated
by the Effective Perceived Noise Level rating in decibels used to deline-
ate NEF area 'C.'
40 Cal. App. 3d at 484 n.8, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 171 n.8.
96. Id. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
[Vol. 20
THE HIGHWAY CASES
highway cases. City of Yakima v. Dahlin97 was a condemna-
tion action brought by the city to secure property for the con-
struction of an overpass. The overpass required the construc-
tion of a concrete wall that would rise gradually to a height of
twenty feet within twenty feet of Dahlin's property, a ware-
house. There was to be a lane of traffic between the wall and
the warehouse. The court found that, although there was no
physical appropriation of property, the new construction
would create an echo chamber that would elevate noise inten-
sity to intolerable levels. Specifically citing Martin v. Port of
Seattle," the court held that the excess noise levels had re-
duced the market value of the property, thereby bringing the
case within the damage provision of the Washington
Constitution."
Cheek v. Floyd County, Georgia'00 reached a similar re-
sult, although the circumstances were not as unique as City of
Yakima. The plaintiff in Cheek was the owner of an apart-
ment building and laundromai that were affected by noise,
fumes, and light beams from an adjacent interchange. The
court held that, if the plaintiff could show a legal nuisance
and substantial injury, noise could be considered as a factor in
assessing damages. 101
In California, it seems only a matter of time before the
physical invasion requirement is put to rest:
California courts, especially, have sought to avoid a ju-
risprudence of classifications grounded in outmoded his-
torical definitions of property rights, and to implement
equitable loss distribution-through inverse condemna-
tion-by a pragmatic assessment of conflicting social in-
terests. Prominent in the accepted approach has been ju-
dicial concern that individual property owners not be
compelled, in the absence of overriding justification, to
bear a disproportionate share of the burdens of public im-
provement programs. 02
97. 5 Wash. App. 129, 485 P.2d 628 (1971).
98. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
99. 5 Wash. App. at 133, 485 P.2d at 630-31.
100. 308 F. Supp. 777 (1970).
101. Id. at 782-83.
102. Van Alstyne, supra note 75, at 534-35 (citations omitted).
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THE NEW STANDARD
Although eventual modification of the physical taking re-
quirement in inverse condemnation as applied in the highway
cases could take any one of a number of forms, it is likely the
courts will follow the path laid down in the airport cases.
10 8 It
is therefore helpful to evaluate the two prevailing variations of
inverse condemnation that are applied in the airport cases
and attempt to reach a conclusion as to which should be ap-
plied in California.
The Martin public benefit standard has only been ac-
cepted by the state of Washington." 4 Under this standard, a
plaintiff need only show that the noise from a nearby highway
caused a measurable, though not necessarily substantial, dimi-
nution in property value. 10 5 The requirement of a substantial
and unreasonable interference was rejected in Martin on the
grounds that it was inappropriate in an inverse condemnation
action and connotes that "the individual must bear a certain
amount of inconvenience and loss of peace and quiet as the
cost of living in a modern, progressing society."10
The standard enunciated in Martin has been applauded
by some as a vindication of heretofore less important property
rights at the expense of the powerful government and con-
struction industry.
Martin, however, and its rejection of the requirement of a
substantial and unreasonable interference, have been criti-
cized on two grounds. First, by resting compensability on any
clear showing of a diminution of property value, the Martin
test provides no guidance as to what degree of harm is re-
quired before compensation can be recovered. The end result
could be enlarged government liability under inverse condem-
103. Other suggestions for modification of the physical appropriation require-
ment are: 1) to change it from a prerequisite for recovery for noise damage to a rebut-
table presumption. Id. at 510; and 2) to use a distance test to distinguish noise dam-
age which is sufficiently substantial to be compensable from that which is not. Id. at
517-18. This standard could be set using studies that measure noise intensities at
various distances, as was done in Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, and would be rebutta-
ble upon a showing of special circumstances, such as unusual topography.
104. Tondell, Noise Litigation at Public Airports, A.B.A. PROCEEDINGS OF THE
SECTION OF THE INSURANCE, NEGLIGENCE, AND COMPENSATION LAW, (1965) at 557, 575,
reprinted in 32 J. AIR. L. AND COMM. 387, 403 (1966).
105. Comment, Inverse Condemnation in Washington-Is the Lid Off Pan-
dora's Box?, 39 WASH. L. REV. 920, 932 (1965).
106. 64 Wash. 2d at 318, 391 P.2d at 546.
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nation to an extent not contemplated by the Constitution; the
fears of those who voice the view that the elimination of the
physical taking or damaging requirement would bankrupt the
government could be realized. So, the elimination of the phys-
ical taking or damaging requirement must be accompanied by
the institution of a theory which will protect the government
from incidental claims, but which will do this in a way that is
rationally related to the damage claimed.
Also, by creating a right of recovery against the govern-
ment for a taking or damaging of property, the state did not
intend to create any more rights than a plaintiff would have
against a citizen who constructed improvements on adjoining
property. 10 7 Martin allows recovery for any decline in market
value where the defendant is a public entity. However, private
landowners are normally entitled to use their land in ways
that may adversely affect the value of adjoining land, with lia-
bility turning on a finding of substantial interference with
property rights. 10 8
Given the present state of the law in California, it is un-
likely that a radical departure, such as Martin, will be at-
tempted initially. As indicated above, 109 the nuisance theory is
a compromise between the strict physical invasion theory and
the very liberal public benefit theory. Its primary appeal lies
in the fact that it permits a rational determination of whether
a claim for noise damage is compensable; at the same time, it
avoids the pitfalls of the public benefit theory by retaining
some threshhold requirement for stating a cause of action.
More important, the nuisance theory has already been em-
107. People v. Symons, 54 Cal. 2d at 861-62, 357 P.2d at 455, 9 Cal. Rptr. at
367. It is important to note that the California courts are not in accord on this point.
For example, the first court to construe the word "damaged" in the California Consti-
tution stated:
We are of the opinion that the right assured to the owner by this provi-
sion of the constitution is not restricted to the case where he is entitled
to recover as for a tort at common law. If he is consequently damaged by
the work done, whether it is done carefully and with skill or not, he is
still entitled to compensation for such damage under this provision.
This provision was intended to assure compensation to the owner, as
well where the damage is directly inflicted, or inflicted by want of care
and skill, as where the damages are consequential, and for which dam-
ages he had no right of recovery at the common law.
Reardon v. City and County of San Francisco, 66 Cal. 492, 505, 6 P. 317, 325 (1885).
108. PROSSER, TORTS § 89, at 596-98 (4th ed. 1971).
109. See text following note 72 supra.
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braced by the California judiciary in Aaron v. City of Los
Angeles.11
Furthermore, the California Supreme Court has recently
extended the application of the nuisance standard to a class of
cases involving odors from sewage treatment plants, another
source of non-physical interference. In Varjebedian v. City of
Madera,"' the court held that fumes may cause a taking or
damaging of property if they constitute a substantial burden
on the property."' This result is a departure from earlier
cases involving similar interferences that required a physical
taking or damaging.118
The nuisance standard has thus been adopted in at least
two classes of cases that at one time required a physical tak-
ing or damaging as a prerequisite for recovery for non-physi-
cal damage. People who suffer from noise damage caused by
automobiles on nearby streets and highways are now uniquely
required to allege and prove such a physical invasion. The ex-
tension of the nuisance standard to the highway cases would
permit homeowners in these cases the same rights as noise
sufferers next to airports and people like the Varjebedians in
the sewage treatment plant context; the result would be a
more consistent application of inverse condemnation to cases
110. See text accompanying notes 64-70 supra.
111. 20 Cal. 3d 285, 572 P.2d 43, 142 Cal. Rptr. 429 (1978).
112. Id. at 297, 572 P.2d at 51, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 437.
113. See, e.g., County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. Averill, 8 Cal. App. 2d 556, 47
P.2d 786 (1935). In this eminent domain proceeding, the sanitation district brought
suit against Averill for the purpose of acquiring a right-of-way for an outfall sewer
into the Pacific Ocean. Averill sought damages for the value of the property taken as
well as damages resulting from the odors and gases that would be blown over his
property from the area where the sewage was deposited in the ocean, almost a mile
from shore. The court, however, denied Averill's offer of evidence to prove the dam-
ages resulting from the gases and odors. In a passage later cited in People v. Symons,
the court noted:
An owner, whose land is being condemned in part, may not recover
damages in the condemnation action to the remainder of his land caused
by the manner in which the works are to be constructed or operated on
the lands of others.
Id. at 561, 47 P.2d at 788. Further, the court held:
[A]ny detriment which may be suffered by the defendant in the future,
occasioned by the wafting of odors from the sewer shoreward . . . not
discharged from that portion which crosses his land, may not be recov-
ered in this action by way of damages to his land. The supposition that
the sewer will be operated so as to become a nuisance is immaterial to
the issue of damages for the taking of the land. (Emphasis added.)
Id. at 563-64, 47 P.2d at 789.
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involving non-physical damage to property in California. It is
therefore a step that can and should be taken.
CONCLUSION
The time is ripe for change in California. People v. Sy-
mons came under immediate attack when it was decided. The
line of decisions that it engendered has been limited, and has
provoked strong words of disagreement from the California
courts of appeal because it sets an arbitrary standard for de-
termining compensability for noise emanating from streets
and highways. Recently, the California Legislature spoke on
the issue and indicated an intent to move away from meaning-
less concepts of physical invasion when the inquiry involves
damage from non-physical agents.
Unlike the highway cases, the airport cases have shown
an evolution of legal doctrine whereby physical appropriation
theories have been abandoned in many states, including Cali-
fornia, and replaced with theories that determine whether
noise has resulted in a taking or damaging according to the
degree of interference with enjoyment of property. Accord-
ingly, in many states, airport noise that amounts to a nuisance
may constitute a taking or damaging of property.
The arguments that once seemed to rationalize the incon-
sistency of application of inverse condemnation to airport and
highway cases have now receded. Different levels of noise in
the two situations do not justify the application of different
standards. Fears that the courts would be burdened with large
numbers of law suits are unfounded, given the requirement of
substantial and unreasonable interference and the possibility
of consolidation of suits and class actions. The argument that
the adoption of the new standard would make future highway
construction fiscally unsound ignores the fact that the rate of
construction is rapidly decreasing; this argument further ig-
nores the issue of the social costs of highway construction and
operation. Finally, modern methods of measuring noise inten-
sity that have been successfully applied in airport cases will
provide a means of accurately determining when noise be-
comes so intense as to constitute a substantial interference.
California should therefore extend the principles enunci-
ated in cases such as Aaron v. City of Los Angeles to the
highway situation. Under the nuisance standard, a plaintiff
would recover whenever the noise coming from the highway
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amounted to a substantial and unreasonable interference with
enjoyment of his property. The substantiality of the interfer-
ence could be determined with the use of modern measure-
ment techniques, taking into account special circumstances
such as the surrounding topography." 4 An interference would
be held to be unreasonable whenever a property owner, if un-
compensated, would bear more than his fair share of the pub-
lic burden.115 With present policy tending to favor the claims
of abutting landowners who have been singled out to bear an
unfair share of the cost of nearby streets and highways, these
plaintiffs would face better prospects for compensation. " ' Re-
covery would be rationally related to the degree of harm
caused, and would not be dependent upon an arbitrary stan-
dard immutably tied to a physical appropriation.
Donald S. Black
114. See text accompanying notes 69 & 95 supra.
115. See text accompanying note 65 supra.
116. See text accompanying note 92 supra.
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